In a Calvo sticky price model based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged, we examine implications of firm-specific labor for determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium under interest rate policy. Firm-specific labor causes higher trend inflation to be more likely to induce not only indeterminacy but also E-instability. The latter is in contrast with the result of Estability in the case of homogeneous labor analyzed in recent research. Moreover, under the same calibration of structural model parameters, indeterminacy and E-instability are much more likely in the case of firm-specific labor than in the case of homogeneous labor. The recent argument-a decline in trend inflation along with the Fed's change from a passive to an active policy response to inflation explains much of the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy during the Great Inflation era to determinacy during the Great Moderation era-depends crucially on the assumption of firm-specific labor.
Introduction
Recent literature has studied implications of positive trend inflation rates for macroeconomic stability using sticky price models based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged. Ascari and Ropele (2009), Hornstein and Wolman (2005) , and Kiley (2007) analyze determinacy of equilibrium under the Taylor (1993) rule and show that higher trend inflation is more likely to induce indeterminacy. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) argue that a decline in trend inflation along with an increase in the Fed's policy response to inflation accounts for much of the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy during the Great Inflation era to determinacy during the Great Moderation era, against Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) who all attribute this shift solely to the Fed's change from a passive to an active policy response to inflation. 1 In a Calvo (1983) Woodford (2005) , firm-specific labor introduces strategic complementarity or real rigidity. 3 As a consequence, the long-run inflation elasticity of output implied by the NKPC is smaller in the case of firm-specific labor than in the case of homogeneous labor, when the trend inflation rate is greater than a certain threshold that is positive but close to zero. 4 Second, price distortion 1 Boivin and Giannoni (2006) show, using counterfactual simulations, that the shift to the Great Moderation cannot be explained solely, or even primarily, by a change in shocks to the U.S. economy, and conclude that in order to explain this shift, it is crucial for the U.S. monetary policy to have changed the way it has, along with the shocks. Kimura and Kurozumi (2010) offer theoretical support for the good policy hypothesis about the shift to the Great Moderation using a Calvo model with endogenous price stickiness. Specifically, they show that a more aggressive monetary policy response to inflation makes firms less likely to reset prices and gives the resulting New Keynesian Phillips curve a flatter slope and a smaller disturbance, as observed during the Great Moderation era, and that such a policy response can stabilize both inflation and the output gap by exploiting the feedback effects of this policy response on firms' price-setting.
has an influence on the inflation dynamics in the case of homogeneous labor as long as the elasticity of labor supply is finite and the trend inflation rate is non-zero, but not in the case of firm-specific labor. Thus, when labor is homogeneous, the law of motion of price distortion adds lagged price distortion to the set of relevant model state variables. Despite these differences, the existing literature lacks a comparison of sticky price models with homogeneous labor and with firm-specific labor in terms of equilibrium determinacy or macroeconomic stability.
The present paper fills this gap using a Calvo sticky price model with firm-specific labor based on Gorodnichenko (2008, 2011 ) and its associated model with homogeneous labor, which is a stochastic version of the baseline model of Ascari and Ropele (2009) . We also examine expectational stability (E-stability) of fundamental rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the model with firm-specific labor, and compare it with that in the model with homogeneous labor. 5 As McCallum (2007) indicates, E-stability is very closely linked with least-squares learnability (i.e., stability under least-squares learning) and this learnability is arguably a necessary property for an REE to be plausible as equilibrium for the model at hand. In a broad class of linear models with expectations (including the log-linearized model of the present paper), a non-explosive fundamental REE is least-squares learnable if it is Estable; otherwise, it is not least-squares learnable (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 ). Therefore, E-stability is an essential condition for an REE to be regarded as plausible.
We establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of REE and for Estability of fundamental REE when labor is firm-specific. Using these analytical conditions and a plausible calibration of structural model parameters, we show that firm-specific labor causes higher trend inflation to be more likely to induce not only indeterminacy of REE but also E-instability of fundamental REE. Moreover, we find that under the same calibration, indeterminacy and E-instability are much more likely in the case of firm-specific labor than in the case of homogeneous labor.
When labor is firm-specific, higher trend inflation is more likely to generate indeterminacy, as shown in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) . This result is qualitatively consistent with that of Ascari and Ropele (2009) who study the case of homogeneous labor, but firm-specific labor is much more likely to cause indeterminacy under the same calibration of structural model parameters. 6 This is because firm-specific labor introduces strategic complementarity, which is a source of indeterminacy as is the case with firm-specific capital analyzed in Sveen and Weinke (2005, 2007) . Specifically, two key conditions for determinacy are less likely to be satisfied in the model with firm-specific labor under the same calibration. One condition is the long-run version of the Taylor principle: in the long run the interest rate should be raised by more than the increase in inflation. This Taylor principle is less likely to be met as the longrun inflation elasticity of output is smaller. When the trend inflation rate is greater than a certain threshold that is positive but close to zero, the strategic complementarity incorporated by firm-specific labor makes the elasticity smaller and thereby causes the long-run version of the Taylor principle to be less likely to be satisfied. As a consequence, a large policy response to current or expected future output induces indeterminacy in the case of firm-specific labor, even if such a response may ensure determinacy under the same calibration in the case of homogeneous labor. The other condition for determinacy causes a small policy response to current or expected future output to induce indeterminacy under positive trend inflation rates.
This condition is also less likely to be met in the case of firm-specific labor than in the case of homogeneous labor, when the same calibration is used in these two cases.
Our result of E-instability in the case of firm-specific labor is in contrast with the result of E-stability in the case of homogeneous labor. In the latter case, E-stability of fundamental REE is likely even when trend inflation is high, as shown in Kurozumi (2011) . This difference is due to two factors. First, the long-run version of the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for Estability of fundamental REE as well. Therefore, as with the result regarding determinacy, the different result regarding E-stability arises because the long-run version of the Taylor principle is less likely to be satisfied in the case of firm-specific labor than in the case of homogeneous labor. Second, when labor is homogeneous, the NKPC depends on price distortion as long as the elasticity of labor supply is finite and the trend inflation rate is non-zero, and hence the law of motion of price distortion adds lagged price distortion to the set of relevant model state Romer (1990) , Kiley (2000) , Devereux and Yetman (2002) , and . This is because the longrun inflation elasticity of output implied by the NKPC declines substantially with higher trend inflation in the case of exogenously given price stickiness, whereas in the case of endogenous price stickiness the decline in the elasticity is mitigated as higher trend inflation leads to a higher probability of price adjustment.
variables. However, this is not the case when labor is firm-specific. For the REE in question, Estability examines whether an associated equilibrium in which agents form expectations under adaptive learning reaches over time the REE. For such expectation formation, lagged price distortion is useful information in the model with homogeneous labor. Particularly, it helps agents form inflation expectations, since price distortion affects inflation dynamics. Therefore, E-stability is likely in the case of homogeneous labor. By contrast, in the case of firm-specific labor, price distortion is absent in the set of relevant model state variables and hence higher trend inflation is much more likely to induce E-instability. 7 Our results demonstrate that indeterminacy and E-instability are much more likely in the model with firm-specific labor than in the model with homogeneous labor. Specifically, the argument of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)-who use the former model to show that a decline in trend inflation plays a key role in the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy during the Great Inflation era to determinacy during the Great Moderation era-depends crucially on the assumption of firm-specific labor. 8 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a Calvo sticky price model with firm-specific labor. In this model, Section 3 derives conditions for equilibrium determinacy and for E-stability of fundamental REE and investigates implications of these conditions. Section 4 compares the results regarding determinacy and E-stability with those in the case of homogeneous labor. Finally, Section 5 concludes. and hence it is absent in the set of relevant model state variables. Consequently, they reach the conclusion that when trend inflation is high, E-instability is likely. This is qualitatively consistent with our result of E-instability obtained in the case of firm-specific labor. suggesting that the Fed's change from a passive to an active policy response to inflation is likely to have been the main driver leading the U.S. economy to a unique equilibrium during the Great Moderation era.
A Calvo sticky price model with firm-specific labor
The model is a Calvo sticky price model based on Gorodnichenko (2008, 2011 The behavior of each economic agent is described in turn.
Household
The representative household consumes C t final goods, supplies {N t (i)} labor specific to each intermediate-good firm i ∈ [0, 1], and purchases S t one-period riskless bonds so as to maximize the utility function
subject to the budget constraint
where E t is the rational expectation operator conditional on information available in period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, η ≥ 0 is the elasticity of labor supply, ε t is a preference shock governed by a first-order autoregression process with a persistence parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1), P t is the price of final goods, W t (i) is the wage paid by intermediate-good firm i, R t is the gross interest rate on bonds, and T t consists of lump-sum transfers and firm profits.
Combining first-order conditions for utility maximization with respect to consumption, labor supply, and bond holdings yields
where Π t = P t /P t−1 denotes gross inflation.
Firms
The representative final-good firm produces homogeneous goods Y t under perfect competition by choosing a combination of intermediate inputs {Y t (i)} so as to maximize profit
subject to the CES production technology
where P t (i) is the price of intermediate good i and θ > 1 is the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The first-order condition for profit maximization yields the final-good firm's demand for
while perfect competition in the final-good market leads to
The final-good market clearing condition is given by
Each intermediate-good firm i produces one kind of differentiated goods Y t (i) under monopolistic competition. Firm i's production function is given by
where α ∈ (0, 1] is the labor elasticity of output and the technology A t follows the process
where g is the rate of technological change.
The first-order condition for minimization of production cost determines firm i's marginal
firms set prices of their products on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983) . Each period a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of firms keeps previous-period prices unchanged, while the remaining fraction 1 − λ of firms sets the price B t (i) so as to maximize the profit function
where
is the stochastic discount factor for a unit of money between period t and period t + j. For this profit function to be well-defined, the following assumption is imposed throughout the paper. Using eqs. (1), (3), (5), (6), and (8), the first-order condition for staggered price-setting leads to
Assumption 1 The two inequalities λΠ
where B t is the price set by firms that reoptimize prices in period t and the composite parameter γ is given by γ = (1 + 1/η)/α. Moreover, the final goods' price equation (4) can be reduced to
Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts interest rate policy according to a Taylor (1993) rule. This rule adjusts the interest rate R t in response to deviations of either contemporaneous or expected future inflation and output from their trend levels
where R is the gross steady-state interest rate, y is the steady-state level of detrended output 
Log-linearized equilibrium conditions
Under Assumption 1, detrending and log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (2), (5), (9), (10) , and (11) leads toŷ
where all hatted variables represent log-deviations from steady-state values.
Eq. (13) presents a general formulation of the NKPC, since under the zero trend inflation rate (i.e.,Π = 1), this equation is rewritten aŝ
which can be reduced toΠ
Calibration
The ensuing analysis uses a plausible calibration of structural model parameters to illustrate conditions for determinacy and E-stability. The benchmark calibration for the quarterly model is summarized in Table 1 . In line with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), we set the subjective discount factor at β = 0.99, the elasticity of labor supply at η = 1, the price elasticity of demand for differentiated intermediate goods at θ = 10, the labor elasticity of output at α = 1, and the probability of no price adjustment at λ = 0.55. Then, we have γ = (1 + 1/η)/α = 2. We also choose the persistence of preference shocks at ρ = 0.35 similarly to Woodford (2003) . Note that to meet Assumption 1 under this calibration, the annualized trend inflation rate needs to be less than 12 percent.
Analysis of determinacy and E-stability
This section establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of REE and for E-stability of fundamental REE in the model presented in the preceding section, and then investigates implications of these conditions using the calibration of model parameters presented in Table 1 .
Determinacy conditions
For the analysis of equilibrium determinacy, the log-linearized equilibrium conditions (12)- (14) can be reduced to a system of the form
In this system all variables in x t are non-predetermined. Hence, the REE is determinate if and only if all eigenvalues of the matrix A are inside the unit circle. Thus, the next two propositions can be obtained.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the interest rate policy is outcome-based, that is, i = 0 in eq. (14), and Assumption 1 holds. Then, the REE is determinate if and only if the next two inequalities
are satisfied.
where ϵ y is given by
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the interest rate policy is forecast-based, that is, i = 1 in eq. (14),
and Assumption 1 holds. Then, the REE is determinate if and only if the condition (16) and 9 The form of the coefficient vector B is omitted, since it is not needed in what follows.
the next two inequalities are satisfied.
where ω is given by
Proof See Appendix C.
The condition (16) can be interpreted as the long-run version of the Taylor principle. The NKPC (13) implies that each percentage point of permanently higher inflation yields ϵ y percentage points of permanently higher output. Hence, ϵ y represents the long-run inflation elasticity of output. Then, ϕ π + ϕ y ϵ y shows the permanent increase in the interest rate by the interest rate policy (14) in response to each unit permanent increase in inflation. Therefore, the condition (16) suggests that in the long run the interest rate should be raised by more than the increase in inflation. Note that the long-run version of the Taylor principle (16) is less likely to be satisfied for the interest rate policy coefficients ϕ π , ϕ y ≥ 0 as the long-run inflation elasticity of output ϵ y is smaller.
E-stability conditions
We turn next to the analysis of E-stability of fundamental REE. E t in the system of eqs. (12)- (14). Then, the system can be reduced to
where z t = [Π tŷt ] ′ and the coefficient matrices C, D are given in Appendix A. 10 In this system, fundamental REE is given by
10 The form of the coefficient vector F is omitted, since it is not needed in what follows.
where I denotes a conformable identity matrix. 
Using forecasts from this PLM to substituteÊ t z t+1 andÊ t z t+2 out of the system (20) leads to the actual law of motion (ALM) of z t
Then, the mapping T from the PLM (22) to the ALM (23) can be defined by
For the fundamental REE (c,Γ) to be E-stable, the matrix differential equation 
Proof See Appendix D. 
Proof See Appendix E.
Implications of determinacy and E-stability conditions
We now illustrate the conditions for determinacy and for E-stability given in Propositions 1 to 4 using the calibration of model parameters presented in Table 1 .
For the outcome-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 0 in eq. (14)), Fig. 1 shows regions of the policy coefficients (ϕ π , ϕ y ) that guarantee determinacy of REE or E-stability of fundamental REE in the cases of the annualized trend inflation rate of two, four, six, and eight percent. demonstrate that higher trend inflation is more likely to induce not only indeterminacy but also E-instability. Indeed, Taylor's estimates generate indeterminacy and E-instability once the annualized trend inflation rate is equal to or greater than four percent. Moreover, higher trend inflation is more likely to generate indeterminacy rather than E-instability, especially when the policy response to output is small. Indeed, in the case of the outcome-based policy with no response to output (i.e., ϕ y = 0), determinacy requires a very active policy response to inflation under the annualized trend inflation rate of four percent, whereas E-stability requires a mildly active one. The forecast-based policy with no response to expected future output induces indeterminacy for any trend inflation rate considered unless the policy response to expected future inflation is extremely strong, whereas it ensures E-stability in the cases of the annualized trend inflation rate of two and four percent as long as the policy response to expected future inflation is strong enough.
When trend inflation increases, the long-run inflation elasticity of output ϵ y declines, as can be seen in Fig. 3 . Therefore, the long-run version of the Taylor principle (16) is less likely to be satisfied for the interest rate policy coefficients ϕ π , ϕ y ≥ 0, as noted above. For instance, the coefficients estimated by Taylor (1993) (i.e. (ϕ π , ϕ y ) = (1.5, 0.125)) no longer satisfy the longrun version of the Taylor principle once the annualized trend inflation rate is equal to or greater than four percent. Moreover, when the trend inflation rate is greater than a certain threshold that makes the numerator of the long-run inflation elasticity of output ϵ y equal to zero (i.e., 0.2 percent in annualized rate terms), the elasticity becomes negative. As a consequence, a large policy response to output induces indeterminacy and E-instability.
A small policy response to output also makes indeterminacy and E-instability more likely under higher trend inflation. The indeterminacy region of the interest rate policy coefficients expands with higher trend inflation, because the condition (17) is less likely to be satisfied in the case of the outcome-based policy and the condition (19) is less likely to be met in the case of the forecast-based policy. 11 The E-instability region expands with higher trend inflation, because the condition (24) is less likely to be satisfied in the case of the outcome-based policy and the condition (26) is less likely to be met in the case of the forecast-based policy.
Comparison with the case of homogeneous labor
This section compares the cases of firm-specific labor and homogeneous labor in terms of determinacy of REE and E-stability of fundamental REE.
When labor is homogeneous, the utility function of the representative household is
and the budget constraint is
In addition to the long-run version of the Taylor principle (16), the condition (18) imposes an upper bound on the size of the policy response to expected future output that ensures determinacy. However, this upper bound is substantially larger than the maximum value of the policy coefficient considered in Fig. 2 .
where N t is the supply of homogeneous labor and W t is its wage. Combining first-order conditions for utility maximization with respect to consumption and labor supply yields
The first-order condition for intermediate-good firm i's minimization of production cost determines this firm's marginal cost
The labor market clearing condition is given by
Using this equation and eqs. (3), (5), (6), (28) , and (29), the first-order condition for staggered price-setting leads to
where d t = ∫ 1 0 (P t (i)/P t ) −θ/α di denotes price distortion and evolves according to
Under Assumption 1, detrending and log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (10), (30) , and (31) leads tô
In line with Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Kurozumi (2011) , the NKPC (32) now depends on price distortion and therefore eq. (33) adds lagged price distortiond t−1 to the set of relevant state variables of the model with homogeneous labor, as long as the elasticity of labor supply is finite (i.e., η < ∞) and the trend inflation rate is non-zero (i.e.,Π ̸ = 1). Consequently, it seems impossible to analytically investigate determinacy and E-stability and we examine them numerically.
We now compare the models with firm-specific labor and with homogeneous labor in terms of determinacy of REE and E-stability of fundamental REE under the outcome-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 0 in eq. (14)). Fig. 4 illustrates regions of the outcome-based policy coefficients (ϕ π , ϕ y ) that guarantee determinacy of REE or E-stability of fundamental REE in the model with homogeneous labor when the annualized trend inflation rate is two, four, six, or eight percent, using the calibration of parameters presented in Table 1 . This figure shows that for moderate rates of trend inflation (e.g., two, four, and six percent), both determinacy and E-stability are ensured as long as the policy coefficients satisfy the long-run version of the Taylor principle which is of the same form as the one (16) except that the long-run inflation elasticity of output is now given by 12
When trend inflation is high (e.g., eight percent), determinacy and E-stability are ensured basically as long as the long-run version of the Taylor principle is met, except for a very small region of the policy coefficients that induce indeterminacy of REE but generate E-stable fundamental REE. For instance, in the case of no policy response to output (i.e., ϕ y = 0), a policy response to inflation ϕ π in the interval (1.010, 1.017) induces indeterminacy and Estability. Therefore, regardless of the rate of trend inflation, the interest rate does not need to be adjusted much more than one-for-one with current inflation to satisfy the long-run version of the Taylor principle under the calibration. Hence, a low rate of trend inflation is not required to ensure determinacy and E-stability under the calibration, as long as the policy rate is adjusted one-for-one or slightly more strongly with contemporaneous inflation. We turn next to the forecast-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 1 in eq. (14)). Fig. 5 12 Note that in the case of an infinite elasticity of labor supply (i.e., η = ∞), the NKPC coincides in the models with firm-specific labor and with homogeneous labor, and hence not only the long-run inflation elasticity of output but also the long-run version of the Taylor principle is the same in these two models.
illustrates regions of the forecast-based policy coefficients (ϕ π , ϕ y ) that ensure determinacy of REE or E-stability of fundamental REE in the model with homogeneous labor when the annualized trend inflation rate is two, four, six, or eight percent, using the calibration of parameters presented in Table 1 Indeterminacy is much more likely in the model with firm-specific labor because this specification of labor introduces strategic complementarity or real rigidity, which causes indeterminacy like firm-specific capital analyzed in Weinke (2005, 2007) . As shown in Fig. 3 , when the trend inflation rate is greater than a certain threshold (i.e., 0.2 percent in annualized rate terms), the strategic complementarity makes the long-run inflation elasticity of output ϵ y take a smaller negative value and thereby causes the long-run version of the Taylor principle to be less likely to be satisfied. As a consequence, a large policy response to output induces indeterminacy in the model with firm-specific labor, even if such a response may ensure determinacy under the same calibration in the model with homogeneous labor.
expected future output to induce indeterminacy under positive trend inflation rates. This condition is also less likely to be met in the model with firm-specific labor than in the model with homogeneous labor, when the same calibration is used in these two models. Indeed, in the model with homogeneous labor, it is satisfied under the outcome-based interest rate policy for any trend inflation rate considered. When the interest rate policy is forecast-based, the minimum policy response to expected future output required to ensure determinacy increases substantially with higher trend inflation in the model with homogeneous labor, but it increases even more steeply with higher trend inflation in the model with firm-specific labor.
E-instability is much more likely in the model with firm-specific labor than in the model with homogeneous labor for two reasons. First, the long-run version of the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for E-stability of fundamental REE as well. This Taylor principle is, as noted above, less likely to be satisfied in the model with firm-specific labor than in the model with homogeneous labor. Second, the NKPC depends on price distortion in the model with homogeneous labor as long as the elasticity of labor supply is finite and the trend inflation rate is non-zero, but not in the model with firm-specific labor. Then, in the former model, the law of motion of price distortion adds lagged price distortion to the set of relevant state variables. For the REE in question, E-stability examines whether an associated equilibrium in which agents form expectations under adaptive learning reaches over time the REE. For such expectation formation, lagged price distortion is useful information in the model with homogeneous labor.
Particularly, it helps agents form inflation expectations, since price distortion affects inflation dynamics. Therefore, E-stability is likely in the model with homogeneous labor. By contrast, price distortion is absent in the set of relevant state variables of the model with firm-specific labor, and hence higher trend inflation is more likely to induce E-instability.
We have demonstrated that indeterminacy and E-instability are much more likely in the model with firm-specific labor than in the model with homogeneous labor. It follows that the argument of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)-who use the former model to show that a decline in trend inflation plays a key role in the U.S. economy's shift from indeterminacy during the Great Inflation era to determinacy during the Great Moderation era-depends crucially on the assumption of firm-specific labor. Under the calibration of parameters presented in Table 1 , which is also chosen by Coibion and Gorodnichenko, the model with homogeneous labor argues for Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , who all attribute the U.S. economy's shift to the Great Moderation solely to the Fed's change from a passive to an active policy response to inflation.
Concluding remarks
In a Calvo sticky price model based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged, this paper has examined implications of firm-specific labor for determinacy and E-stability of REE under interest rate policy. It has shown that firm-specific labor causes higher trend inflation to be more likely to induce not only indeterminacy of REE but also Thus, future work will estimate the models with firm-specific labor and with homogeneous labor using the method of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) to empirically address the question of whether a decline in trend inflation is a cause of such a shift from indeterminacy to determinacy in the U.S. economy.
Appendix
A Coefficient matrices in systems (15) and (20) In the case of the outcome-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 0 in eq. (14)), the coefficient matrix A of the system (15) is given by 
,
.
In the case of the forecast-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 1 in eq. (14)), the coefficient matrix A of the system (15) is given by
In both the cases of the interest rate policy (i.e., i = 0, 1 in eq. (14)), the coefficient matrices 
B Proof of Proposition 1
In the case of the outcome-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 0 in eq. (14)), the characteristic equation for the coefficient matrix A of the system (15) is given by
The REE is determinate if and only if all eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix A are inside the unit circle, and hence the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is that all solutions to the characteristic equation are less than unity in absolute value. Therefore, from the Cohn-Schur criterion (see, e.g., Gandolfo, 1997) , it follows that the REE is determinate if and only if the next three inequalities hold.
The first inequality can be reduced to the long-run version of the Taylor principle (16) . It can be shown that the second inequality is satisfied under Assumption 1. The third inequality is defined, for conciseness, as
C Proof of Proposition 2
In the case of the forecast-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 1 in eq. (14)), the characteristic equation for the coefficient matrix A of the system (15) is given by
The REE is determinate if and only if all eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix A are inside the unit circle, and hence the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is that all solutions to the characteristic equation are less than unity in absolute value. Therefore, from the Cohn-Schur criterion, it follows that the REE is determinate if and only if the next three inequalities hold.
The first inequality can be reduced to the long-run version of the Taylor principle (16). The second inequality can be written as condition (18) . The third inequality is defined, for conciseness,
D Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumption 1, the fundamental REE with the outcome-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 0 in eq. (14) 
By the Routh-Hurwitz theorem (see, e.g., Samuelson, 1947) (24) and (25), respectively. The remaining inequality b 3 > 0 can be reduced to
We can show that this inequality is implied by the condition (24), since 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
E Proof of Proposition 4
Under Assumption 1, the fundamental REE with the forecast-based interest rate policy (i.e., i = 1 in eq. (14) 
where We can show that this inequality is implied by the condition (26), since 0 ≤ ρ < 1. 
